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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

CPL § 30.30(4)(g): Court congestion not "exceptional circumstance" excusing prosecutor'sfailure to be ready for trial
CPL section 30.30 places the burden upon the prosecutor to be
ready for trial within certain prescribed time limits. 2 8 Absent "exceptional circumstances," failure to be ready justifies dismissal of
an action upon timely motion by the defendant. 29 It had been unCPL § 30.30(1) (Supp. 1979-1980) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in subdivision three, a motion [for dismissal of
information or indictment] must be granted where the people are not ready for
trial within:
(a) six months of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
felony;,
(b) ninety days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than
three months and none of which is a felony;
(c) sixty days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein
the defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is
a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of not more
than three months and none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months;
(d) thirty days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein
the defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is
a violation and none of which is a crime.
Id.
The genesis of the statute may be found in a criminal defendant's right to a speedy
trial, a guarantee fundamental to the common law tradition of England, see Magna Carta,
25 Edw. 1, c. 29 (1297), and the United States. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37-38
(1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120
(1966); U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right is made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967); People v. Garcia, 51
App. Div. 2d 329, 331, 381 N.Y.S.2d 271, 273 (1st Dep't 1976), afl'd mem., 41 N.Y.2d 861,
362 N.E.2d 260, 393 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1977). Notably, the Supreme Court has declined to provide uniform guidelines for the implementation of the right, leaving it to the states to formulate individual rules consistent with constitutional standards. See Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 523 (1972).
CPL section 30.30 was enacted to facilitate prompt disposition of criminal actions.
Memorandum of State Executive Department, Crime Control Council, reprinted in [1972]
N.Y. Laws 3259 (McKinney). It was believed that the promotion of swift and certain punishment would serve as an effective deterrent to crime. Id.; see People v. Mollette, 87 Misc.
2d 236, 241, 383 N.Y.S.2d 817, 822 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1976). Additionally, the facilitation of speedy trials would insulate defendants from prolonged imprisonment and obviate
the anxiety and suspicion which may derive from unprosecuted accusations of crime. People
v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271, 275-76, 342 N.E.2d 525, 528, 379 N.Y.S.2d 735, 740 (1975).
2*CPL § 30.30(1) (Supp. 1979-1980). The presence of "exceptional circumstances" may
affect a defendant's 30.30 ready trial right in two ways. Under CPL section 30.30(3)(b), a
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clear whether docket congestion" is an exceptional circumstance
excusing delay which would otherwise require dismissal.3 ' Recently, however, in People v. Brothers,82 the Court of Appeals held
that "court congestion does not excuse the People's failure to be
ready for trial,"3 3 but indicated in dicta that a subsequent plea of
guilty may operate as a waiver of the statutory entitlement to
34
dismissal.

The defendant in Brothers was arrested on New Year's Day,
defendant's motion to dismiss may be denied where the People were ready for trial within
the time specified but exceptional circumstances subsequently rendered the People unready.
CPL § 30.30(3)(b) (Supp. 1979-1980). Further, CPL section 30.30(4)(g) provides that the
period of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances extends the time within which the
prosecutor must be ready for trial. CPL § 30.30(4)(g) (Supp. 1979-1980).
What constitutes "exceptional circumstances" excusing prosecutorial delay is a discretionary determination by the court made on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 43 N.Y.2d 772, 773-74, 372 N.E.2d 795, 795, 401 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1008 (1977) (ongoing
narcotics investigation is not exceptional circumstance); People v. Goodman, 41 N.Y.2d 888,
889, 362 N.E.2d 615, 616, 393 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (1977) (assault victim's unavailability is
exceptional circumstance); People v. Rice, 67 App. Div. 2d 817, 817, 413 N.Y.S.2d 55, 56
(4th Dep't 1979) (replacement of first district attorney in case and subsequent electoral defeat of his successor is exceptional circumstance); People v. Hall, 61 App. Div. 2d 1050, 1051,
403 N.Y.S.2d 112, 113 (2d Dep't 1978) (nervous breakdown of stenographer in grand jury
proceeding is exceptional circumstance); People v. Scaccia, 55 App. Div. 2d 444, 446, 390
N.Y.S.2d 743, 745 (4th Dep't 1977) (lack of scheduled trial term following indictment is
exceptional circumstance).
SO Docket congestion results primarily from the volume of cases funneled into the criminal justice system. In 1971, it was estimated that the average caseload per judge in New
York City was 4,054. In 1977, the number had risen to 5,338 cases. There were 77 judges
sitting in the criminal courts in 1971, but only 63 in 1977. Wilkins, New York City Criminal
Courts Hard-Pressedby Heavy Caseload, N.Y. Times, April 21, 1978, § 2, at 4, col. 5. See
generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
REPORT- THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 127-28 (1967); PRESMENT'S COMI~sSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:. THE
COURTS 31-32 (1967).
31 Some courts have held that docket congestion alone or in combination with other
factors will excuse delay in complying with the ready trial mandate of CPL section 30.30.
See, e.g., People v. Scaccia, 55 App. Div. 2d 444, 446, 390 N.Y.S.2d 743, 745 (4th Dep't
1977); People v. Thomas, 49 App. Div. 2d 694, 694, 370 N.Y.S.2d 763, 764 (4th Dep't 1975);
People v. Rivera, 98 Misc. 2d 986, 990, 414 N.Y.S.2d 972, 975 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1979).
Not all courts, however, have found docket congestion sufficient to excuse the unreadiness of
the People. See, e.g., People v. Bonterre, 87 Misc. 2d 243, 244, 384 N.Y.S.2d 351, 353
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx County 1976). Previously, the Court of Appeals expressly left open
the question of whether or not court congestion represents "exceptional circumstances"
under CPL section 30.30. People ex rel. Franklin v. Warden, 31 N.Y.2d 498, 502 n.4, 294
N.E.2d 199, 201 n.4, 341 N.Y.S.2d 604, 606 n.4 (1973).
50 N.Y.2d 413, 407 N.E.2d, 405, 429 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1980), rev'g, 69 App. Div. 2d 908,
416 N.Y.S.2d 158 (2d Dep't 1979) (mem.).
50 N.Y.2d at 415, 407 N.E.2d at 405, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
Id. at 418, 407 N.E.2d at 407, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
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1975 for driving while intoxicated.3 5 He was indicted and arraigned
six weeks later in Suffolk County Court.38 The case appeared on
the court calendar for March and again for April. 7 In April, the
case was transferred to a "ready reserve" calendar where it remained until January 20, 1976.1a At that time, it was transferred to
the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, and placed on the calendar for
February.3 9 In March, approximately thirteen months after the indictment, the defendant moved for dismissal under CPL section
30.30.40 The prosecutor submitted no papers in opposition to defendant's motion 1 but, sua sponte, the court introduced statistical
data documenting docket congestion in Suffolk County Court.42
Based upon this data and his personal knowledge of the calendar
backlog, the hearing judge denied the defendant's motion, reason- Id. at 415, 407 N.E.2d at 405, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
" Id. The indictment consisted of two counts of driving while intoxicated, a class E
felony under the Vehicle and Traffic Law. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192 (McKinney
Supp. 1979-1980). Since the defendant was charged with a felony, he was entitled to have
the indictment dismissed, pursuant to the ready trial provision, if the people were not ready
for trial within six months. CPL § 30.30(1)(a) (Supp. 1979-1980); see note 28 supra.
- 50 N.Y.2d at 415, 407 N.E.2d at 405, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 558. Although courts in New
York have inherent power to regulate their calendars, docket scheduling is left to the discretion of the district attorney. People v. Vincent, 34 App. Div. 2d 705, 706, 309 N.Y.S.2d 690,
692 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d 964, 267 N.E.2d 273, 318 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1970); McDonald v.
Goldstein, 273 App. Div. 649, 650-51, 79 N.Y.S.2d 690, 693-94 (2d Dep't 1948); People v.
Bermudez, 84 Misc. 2d 1071, 1073, 377 N.Y.S.2d 899, 902 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975);
Gleason v. Mullen, 204 Misc. 450, 452, 121 N.Y.S.2d 605, 607 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1953).
Generally, a district attorney will place cases on a court calendar according to some type of
priority system. Common examples of priority systems include those based on chronological
order, see People v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271, 278, 342 N.E.2d 525, 530, 379 N.Y.S.2d 735,
742 (1975), and those based on the severity of the offense committed and the length of
defendant's incarceration, see People v. Kelly, 38 N.Y.2d 633, 636-37, 345 N.E.2d 544, 546,
382 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1976).
50 N.Y.2d at 415, 407 N.E.2d at 405, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 558. In Suffolk County, there
are three types of court calendars: the conference calendar, the ready reserve calendar, and
the ready trial calendar. The conference calendar is a "pretrial" calendar scheduling cases
after arraignment for determining their future courses through the system. The ready trial
calendar schedules those cases ready for trial. The ready reserve calendar is a "control"
calendar which functions to keep track of a particular case. The cases placed on the ready
reserve calendar are those cases which, while not yet ready to go to trial, are immediately
next in line. Conversation with Court Clerk, Criminal Division, Suffolk County Court (Oct.
15, 1980).
:9 50 N.Y.2d at 415, 407 N.E.2d at 405, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
40 Id. The defendant also moved for dismissal under CPL section 30.20, a statutory
codification of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Id.; CPL § 30.20 (Supp. 1979-1980).
41 50 N.Y.2d at 415, 407 N.E.2d at 405, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 559. On oral argument of the
defendant's motion to dismiss, the district attorney asserted that he had been ready to proceed to trial as early as April, 1975. Id. at 416, 407 N.E.2d at 406, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
42 Id. at 415, 407 N.E.2d at 405-06, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
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ing that court congestion coupled with the limited availability of
judges was an "exceptional circumstance" excusing prosecutorial

unreadiness. 43 The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty and sentence was imposed." The Appellate Division, Second Department,
affirmed the judgment of conviction.4 5
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, vacated the conviction, and dismissed the indictment. 8 Judge Jones, writing for the
majority, 47 determined initially that placing the case on a "ready
reserve" calendar was not a sufficient indication of the prosecutor's
readiness to satisfy the requirements of CPL section 30.30.48 Only
a formal communication of readiness by the prosecutor on the record would suffice, according to the majority, to demonstrate readi-

ness for trial. 49 Turning to the issue of whether docket congestion
excused the prosecutorial delay, the Court acknowledged that
there was "little practical sense" in requiring the prosecutor to
prepare his case for trial months in advance for the sole purpose of
4" Id. at 415, 407 N.E.2d at 406, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 559. It may be surmised that the
hearing judge denied the defendant's motion to dismiss in part because the defendant was
not incarcerated during the period of delay. While defendants released on bail or on their
own recognizance do not forfeit their right to prompt dispositions, preference is given to
those cases in which the defendant is incarcerated. CPL § 30.20(2) (Supp. 1979-1980); see,
e.g., People v. Kelly, 38 N.Y.2d 633, 636-37, 345 N.E.2d 544, 546, 382 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1976);
People v. Artonio, 42 App. Div. 2d 716, 716, 345 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (2d Dep't 1973); note 63
infra.
50 N.Y.2d at 415, 407 N.E.2d at 406, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
69 App. Div. 2d 908, 416 N.Y.S.2d 158 (2d Dep't 1979) (mem.), rev'd, 50 N.Y.2d 413,
407 N.E.2d 405, 429 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1980).
46 50 N.Y.2d at 418, 407 N.E.2d at 407, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
Joining Judge Jones in the majority were Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Gabrielli,
Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Meyer. Judge Jasen dissented in a separate opinion.
48 50 N.Y.2d at 416, 407 N.E.2d at 406, 429 N.Y.2d at 559.
'9 Id. (citing People v. Hamilton, 46 N.Y.2d 932, 388 N.E.2d 345, 415 N.Y.S.2d 208
(1979)). In Hamilton, the defendant suffered a delay of 1 year and 13 days between the
filing of the felony complaint and the date the People were prepared to go to trial. 46
N.Y.2d at 933, 388 N.E.2d at 345, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 209. The prosecutor contended that the
delay was occasioned by the need to investigate the crime further. Additionally, he asserted
that he had been ready to proceed to trial on an earlier date. Id. at 933, 388 N.E.2d at 34546, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 209. The Court found neither to be supported by the record. According
to the Court, in order to render the statute inoperative, "the People must communicate
readiness for trial to the court on the record when ready to proceed." Id. at 933, 388 N.E.2d
at 346, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 209 (emphasis added). The Court determined that it was "insufficient, as a matter of law, to inform the court of such a claim for the first time in an affidavit
submitted in response to a motion to dismiss the indictment." Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, the Brothers majority rejected as insufficient the prosecutor's protestations of prior
readiness asserted for the first time on argument of the defendant's motion to dismiss. 50
N.Y.2d at 416, 407 N.E.2d at 406, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
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making a good faith declaration of readiness.5 0 Nevertheless, noting that the statute unequivocally required only that the People be
ready for trial within the prescribed period, not that the trial occur
therein, 51 the majority rejected docket congestion as an "exceptional circumstance" which would excuse prosecutorial unreadiness
under section 30.30.52 In dictum, however, the Court indicated that
a defendant's plea of guilty may waive his right to a dismissal
under the statute."3
50 N.Y.2d at 417-18, 407 N.E.2d at 407, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
51 Id. at 417, 407 N.E.2d at 407, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 560. The Brothers majority noted that

while the statute ambiguously referred to the "people's" readiness, the Court of Appeals had
earlier held that an examination of the legislative history of the provision clearly indicated
that the district attorney, and not the State of New York, was the primary object of the
statute's readiness mandate. Id. at 417, 407 N.E.2d at 406-07, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 560 (quoting
People ex rel. Franklin v. Warden, 31 N.Y.2d 498, 294 N.E.2d 199, 341 N.Y.S.2d 604
(1973)). Consequently, the Court maintained that the statute should not be read as requiring the availability of court facilities. 50 N.Y.2d at 417, 407 N.E.2d at 407, 429 N.Y.S.2d at
560. In People ex rel. Franklin v. Warden, 31 N.Y.2d 498, 294 N.E.2d 199, 341 N.Y.S.2d 604
(1973), quoted extensively by the Brothers Court, the defendants had been detained prior to
trial for more than six months due to their inability to post ball. Id. at 500, 294 N.E.2d at
200, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 605. Although the district attorney was ready for trial within the statutory periods, calendar congestion and the lack of court facilities prevented him from proceeding. Id. at 500, 294 N.E.2d at 200, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 605-06. The defendants contended
that CPL section 30.30 should be construed to require "not only that prosecutor be ready
but that court facilities also be available." Id. at 501, 294 N.E.2d at 201, 341 N.Y.S.2d at
606. Rejecting the defendants' contention, the FranklinCourt asserted that such a construction would "fly in the face of the clear intention of the Legislature" to reject the so-called
"prompt trial" rule. Id. at 502, 294 N.E.2d at 201, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
The prompt trial rule which had been promulgated by the Administrative Board of the
Judicial Conference provided for dismissal of a criminal action "if the cause [had] not been
brought to trial" within the designated time periods. [1980] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 29.1-.7. Accordingly, docket congestion, the lack of court facilities, and any other institutional delay
would trigger a dismissal. Id. Prior to its effective date, however, the legislature expressly
superseded the rule by conditioning dismissal upon prosecutorial unreadiness alone. Ch.
184, § 2, [1972] N.Y. Laws 1019. For an excellent discussion of the evolution of CPL section
30.30, see CPL § 30.30, commentary at 52 (Supp. 1979-1980).
52 50 N.Y.2d at 418, 407 N.E.2d at 407, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
Id. Although declining to decide the issue since it had not been raised on appeal,
accord, People v. Lomax, 50 N.Y.2d 351, 354-55 n.1, 406 N.E.2d 793, 794 n.1, 428 N.Y.S.2d
937, 938 n.1 (1980), the Court warned thb defendants that they risk waiving their 30.30 right
by pleading guilty "even if [such plea is] conditionally expressed (short possibly of a court
sanctioned agreement for preservation)." 50 N.Y.2d at 418, 407 N.E.2d at 407, 429 N.Y.S.2d
at 560. The Court reasoned that since a defendant's right to a dismissal under CPL section
30.30 is distinct from his constitutional right to a speedy trial and merely legislative in origin, a plea of guilty may act as a waiver of the statutory right. Id. The Court drew analogous
support for this proposition from People v. Dodson, 48 N.Y.2d 36, 396 N.E.2d 194, 421
N.Y.S.2d 47 (1979), a case which involved the interrelationship between the "previous prosecution" provisions of CPL section 40.20 and the fifth amendment mandate prohibiting
double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals in Dodson held that a statutory previous prosecution
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Judge Jasen dissented, contending that the People were ready
for trial within the period prescribed by CPL section 30.30." In
the dissent's view, placing the case on the "ready reserve" calendar
sufficed to communicate the prosecutor's readiness for trial on the
record. 5 Thus, Judge Jasen concluded, it was unnecessary to address the question of whether court congestion was an "exceptional
circumstance" excusing lack of readiness.5
By stating definitively that docket congestion does not extend
the time within which the district attorney must be ready for trial
under section 30.30, the Brothers decision resolves an inconsistency in the application of the statute.5 7 In the wake of Brothers,
the prosecutor must communicate his readiness for trial within the
prescribed period or risk dismissal under the statute, irrespective
of his awareness that the trial of the case will be delayed indefinitely due to calendar backlog.5 8 While this strict interpretation of
section 30.30 seems to exalt form over substance,59 it nevertheless
60
appears consonant with legislative intent.
Additionally, Brothers further distinguishes the "ready trial
right" in CPL section 30.30 from the "constitutional speedy trial
right" codified in section 30.20. Generally, a plea of guilty does not
waive a defendant's 30.20 constitutional right. 1 By intimating that
claim "must be duly preserved if there is to be appellate review." Id. at 38, 396 N.E.2d at
195, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 47. Accordingly, the Court determined that a plea of guilty without a
prior or contemporaneous objection based on the statutory claim would be deemed a waiver.
Id. at 39, 396 N.E.2d at 195, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
50 N.Y.2d at 419, 407 N.E.2d at 408, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 561 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 419, 407 N.E.2d at 408, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 561 (Jasen, J., dissenting). According
to the dissent "[wihat more reliable expression of readiness should we require of the District
Attorney than having a case calendared 'ready' for trial and placed on the 'ready reserve
calendar' to follow other ready cases calendared earlier but not reached due to court congestion." Id.
" Id.
57 Previously, some courts had considered the unavailability of court facilities and
prosecutorial readiness as factors which might justify trial delay under CPL section 30.30.
See note 31 supra.
See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra.
See 50 N.Y.2d at 418, 407 N.E.2d at 407, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
60 See note 51 supra. While the genesis of CPL section 30.30 in some measure was in
response to a need to deal with calendar congestion, see Memorandum of State Executive
Department, Crime Control Council, reprinted in [1972] N.Y. Laws 3259 (McKinney), this
concern did not find its way into the statute. Rather, CPL section 30.20, the codification of
the constitutional speedy trial right, is the vehicle by which a defendant's rights to a prompt
adjudication will be protected, notwithstanding court backlog. See People ex rel. Franklin v.
Warden, 31 N.Y.2d 498, 294 N.E.2d 199, 341 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1973).
01 See, e.g., People v. Rathbun, 48 App. Div. 2d 149, 152, 368 N.Y.S.2d 317, 321 (3d
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an opposite result would obtain under section 30.30, the Court suggests that a different inquiry is required under each provision for
the purpose of determining waiver.62 It is likely, therefore, that a
constitutional objection to undue trial delay remains cognizable es
Dep't 1975); People v. Haymes, 47 App. Div. 2d 587, 588, 363 N.Y.S.2d 382, 383-84 (4th
Dep't 1975); cf. People v. Blakley, 34 N.Y.2d 311, 314, 313 N.E.2d 763, 764, 357 N.Y.S.2d
459, 461-62 (1974); People v. Wallace, 26 N.Y.2d 371, 374, 258 N.E.2d 904, 905, 310
N.Y.S.2d 484, 486 (1970); People v. Henderson, 20 N.Y.2d 303, 305-06, 229 N.E.2d 422, 42324, 282 N.Y.S.2d 734, 736-37 (1967) (guilty plea does not constitute waiver under predecessor statute to CPL section 30.20).
The nature of the conduct necessary to establish that defendant has waived his right to
a speedy trial has not been delineated clearly. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 524-31 (1972), the traditional constitutional doctrine of
waiver espoused by lower federal and state courts was the demand rule. See, e.g., United
States v. Maxwell, 383 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1037 (1968);
Mathies v. United States, 374 F.2d 312, 314 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Chinn v. United States, 228
F.2d 151, 153 (4th Cir. 1955); Pines v. District Court, 233 Iowa 1284, 1287, 10 N.W.2d 574,
581 (1943); see Godbold, Speedy Trial-MajorSurgery for a National Ill, 24 ALA. L. REV.
265, 277-80 (1972). See generally Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L.
REV. 1587, 1601-10 (1965). Under this doctrine, a criminal defendant's right to a speedy trial
was deemed waived if not demanded during the period of delay. United States v. Maxwell,
383 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir. 1967). The purpose of the doctrine was to prevent a defendant
from claiming constitutional infringement when he had acquiesced in the delay tacitly by
his silence. See Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 853
(1957). In Barker,however, the Supreme Court rejected the use of the demand rule doctrine
as a condition precedent to an undue delay claim, and relegated it to being but one of the
factors to be considered in speedy trial cases. 407 U.S. at 528. Notably, New York courts
had earlier abandoned the demand rule. See, e.g., People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130
N.E.2d 891 (1955). In Prosser,the Court determined that it was the duty of the prosecutor
to ensure a speedy trial notwithstanding defendant's failure to assert such right. Id. at 358,
130 N.E.2d at 895. Failure to pursue the right as part of trial strategy, however, may be
deemed a conscious abandonment and waiver of a defendant's rights both under sections
30.20 and 30.30. See People v. Rodriquez, 50 N.Y.2d 553, 558, 407 N.E.2d 475, 477, 429
N.Y.S.2d 631, 633 (1980).
12 A valid waiver of a constitutional right may be effectuated if done knowingly and
voluntarily. See People v. Adams, 38 N.Y.2d 605, 607, 345 N.E.2d 318, 319, 381 N.Y.S.2d
847, 848 (1976); People v. White, 32 N.Y.2d 393, 399, 298 N.E.2d 659, 663, 345 N.Y.S.2d 513,
518 (1973). While the strict standard would appear applicable to the speedy trial right
which, although expressed statutorily, has constitutional underpinnings, see generally People v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271, 342 N.E.2d 525, 379 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1975), it would appear
inapplicable to the ready trial right which is completely legislative in origin. See People v.
Brothers, 50 N.Y.2d at 418, 407 N.E.2d at 407, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 560; People v. Dodson, 48
N.Y.2d 36, 39, 396 N.E.2d 194, 195, 421 N.Y.S.2d 47, 48 (1979); note 64 infra.
11 In determining whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been
infringed, federal courts generally balance four principal factors: "[1]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant."
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); see United States v. Carcini, 562 F.2d 144, 148
(2d Cir. 1977); White v. Henderson, 467 F. Supp. 96, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The New York
courts use a similar test, balancing five factors: "(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason
for the delay-, (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an
extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that
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despite a waiver of the ready trial right by a plea of guilty.' It is
submitted, however, that until the Court of Appeals determines
whether or not a plea of guilty waives the right to dismissal under
CPL section 30.30, defense counsel wishing to preserve the statutory claim for undue trial delay would be well advised to raise the
objection prior to or contemporaneous with a guilty plea."5 Failure
to do so may preclude appellate review of the statutory claim.
Wayne J. Keeley
the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay." People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442,
445, 335 N.E.2d 303, 306, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 82 (1975); accord, People v. Dean, 45 N.Y.2d 651,
659, 384 N.E.2d 1277, 1281, 412 N.Y.S.2d 353, 357-58 (1978); People v. Rivera, 98 Misc. 2d
986, 988-89, 414 N.Y.S.2d 972, 974 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1979). Although the implementation of the balancing test generally lies within the discretion of the individual court, certain
guidelines have been enunciated by the Supreme Court:
The length of delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is
some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry
into the other factors that go into the balance .... [T]he length of delay that will
provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances
of the case. To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy
charge.
Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should be assigned to different reasons.
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be
weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless
should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances
must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid
reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
64 In two recent cases the Court has indicated that there may be situations in which a
constitutional or constitutionally based remedy remains despite a waiver of a statutory
claim. In People v. Dodson, 48 N.Y.2d 36, 396 N.E.2d 194, 421 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1979), the
defendant had conceded that her claim of previous prosecution was of statutory and not
constitutional dimension. Id. at 38-39, 396 N.E.2d at 195, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 48. The Court,
finding that there had been a waiver of the statutory claim, nevertheless suggested that had
a constitutional objection been raised instead, it would not have been subject to the same
infirmity. Id. at 39, 396 N.E.2d at 195, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 48. Similarly, in People v. Rodriquez,
50 N.Y.2d 553, 407 N.E.2d 475, 429 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1980), although finding that a defendant
could waive both his constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights by abandonment as
part of a trial strategy, the Court nonetheless indicated that evidence sufficient to establish
waiver of the constitutionally founded remedy contained in CPL section 30.20 might be
greater than that needed to demonstrate relinquishment of the purely statutory remedy of
section 30.30. 50 N.Y.2d at 558, 407 N.E.2d at 477, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
" As Brothers makes clear, a plea of guilty may waive a defendant's right under CPL
section 30.30 notwithstanding a timely objection. See note 53 supra. It is submitted moreover, that even in the absence of a guilty plea, the failure to raise the objection to undue
trial delay until appeal may constitute waiver.

